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law. Although most of these questions have now become settled,
new and more involved ones are coming forth with the intro-
duction of color, the third dimension, and television in this field.
It is therefore apparent that the "Shotwell Bill" should be given
serious consideration in order that the benefits of past experi-
mentation may be enjoyed and the "period of fumbling" in copy-
right litigation be ended. The clarification of the many confused
issues which yet await logical settlement would permit and even
induce a continuation of the rapid growth of the motion picture
industry. There would undoubtedly be a consequent increase in
the value of all literary and musical works possessing any sub-
stantial potentialities as material for use in future productions.
Thus, all parties concerned-authors, composers, publishers,
producers, distributors, exhibitors, and also consumers-would
be directly or indirectly benefited by the adoption of the "Shot-
well Bill."
MILTON H. ARONSON.
THE JOINT TORT-FEASOR IN MISSOURI
The gradual change in the concept of tort liability made of the
tort-feasor a new man. At early common law, the liability of the
tort-feasor was to a large extent imposed as a penalty for his
wrongdoing." If two or more were liable for the tort, any or
all might be held to pay. And, according to Mei-ryweather v.
Nixan,2 those upon whom a levy was made could not enforce con-
tribution by the others. Today, tort liability is no longer imposed
as a penalty. Its purpose is to shift the burden of loss caused
by tortious conduct to those who may be properly required to
bear it. With this change in concept there came a feeling that
the rule denying contribution between joint tort-feasors operated
too harshly in many situations. Nevertheless, the majority of
jurisdictions which have not modified the rule by statute still
deny any right to contribution between joint tort-feasors. 3 Some
1. Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors (1936) 21
Corn. L. Q. 552, 554. Pollock, The Law of Torts (13th ed. 1929) 4: "In
the medieval period the procedure whereby redress was obtained for many
of the injuries now classified as torts bore plain traces of a criminal or
quasi-criminal character, the defendant against whom judgment passed
being liable not only to compensate the plaintiff, but to pay a fine to the
king."
2. (K. B. 1799) 8 T. R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337.
3. Bohlen, supra note 1, at 552; Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity be-
tween Tortfeasors (1932) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 130, 141.
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courts, however, have refused to follow the rule except in respect
to judgments based on intentional wrongs., This result is usually
justified by reference to the fact that contribution originated in
equity and is in accord with "the broad principles of natural jus-
tice." ,5 It has also been suggested that contribution might be
recovered on the basis of "unjust enrichment." 6
In order to avoid the injustices flowing from adherence to
the rule of no contribution, Missouri passed a contribution statute
in 1855.7 A subsequent addition to the statute allows the injured
party to release certain of the tort-feasors without impairing his
right of action against the others. Each of these clauses of the
statute, related though they are, gives rise to different types of
problems. This follows from the fact that release deals with the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants, while con-
tribution centers on the relationship between the defendants
themselves. Consequently, this note is divided into two main
sections, each dealing with one of the aspects and its particular
implications.
ACTIONS AGAINST JOINT TORT-FEASORS
The principle that every tort-feasor who by wrongful act con-
curs in causing injury is liable for the resulting damage is one
firmly established in the law." One who has been injured may
sue, either singly or jointly, each tort-feasor whose negligence
contributed to cause the injury.9 The right to join the defendants
in such an action is recognized by Revised Statutes of Missouri
(1929) section 703:1c
4. Leflar, supra note 3, at 141.
5. Leflar, supra note 3, at 136. See Williams, The Rule in Merryweather
v. Nixon (1901) 17 L. Q. Rev. 293, 299: "But suppose the plaintiff in
Merryweather v. Nixon had * * * filed his bill in the more dingy atmos-
phere of a Court of Equity. Would the result have been the same? It seems
permissible to doubt it."
6. Woodward, Law of Quasi-Contracts (1913) 409, sec. 259. See Keener,
Quasi-Contracts (1893) 408; Leflar, supra note 3, at 136, 137, especially
footnote 33; Note (1930) 18 Calif. L. Rev. 522.
7. R. S. Mo. (1855) c. 51, sec. 8 (now contained in R. S. Mo. (1929)
sec. 3268).
8. Shafir v. Sieben (Mo. 1921) 233 S. W. 419, 424.
9. Page v. Freeman (1854) 19 Mo. 421; Mitchell v. Brown (Mo. App.
1916) 190 S. W. 354, 356; Hendrix v. Corning (1919) 201 Mo. App. 555,
214 S. W. 253; 4 Restatement, Torts (1939) sec. 882.
10. Hutchinson v. Richmond Safety Gate Co. (1912) 247 Mo. 71, 152
S. W. 52, 64; Nokol Co. v. Becker (1927) 318 Mo. 292, 300 S. W. 1108, 1117
(suit in equity for an injunction). A person riding in an automobile and
injured in a collision with another car can join both drivers as defendants
in an action for damages. Sanders v. Marks (1933) 228 Mo. App. 1079, 60
S. W. (2d) 692.
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Every person who shall have a cause of action against
several persons, * * * and who shall be entitled by law to
one satisfaction therefor, may bring suit thereon jointly
against all or as many of the persons liable as he may think
proper; * * *.
Where two defendants were sued jointly in a tort action, it
was contended that proof that only one committed the tort was
not sufficient basis for judgment even as against the defendant
who was guilty. However, by the accepted law of Missouri, joint
liability need not be proved in such situations1' and "consequently
a misjoinder of defendants will not defeat a recovery."'12 This
rule is not altered or modified by the contribution statute as the
provisions of that statute are enabling and not restrictive. Fur-
thermore, the contribution statute "relates to actions in which a
joint liability exists, not to actions in which joint liability is
merely charged and does not exist."13
Subject to much more controversy than the right to sue joint
tort-feasors in one action is the right of the plaintiff to release
one or more of them from liability. The effect of such a release
has undergone far-reaching changes during the past half-cen-
tury. In order to understand the problems arising in connection
with release, one must be aware of the distinction between a
technical "release" and a "covenant not to sue." At common law
the former operates to extinguish the right of action, while the
latter merely gives the covenantee a means of redress, such as a
suit for damages for breach of the covenant. Thus in a case de-
cided before the amendment of the contribution statute, it was
held that where
the injured party releases one joint tort-feasor he will dis-
charge all, yet a covenant not to sue is not a release and it
could not be pleaded by the covenantee in bar of an action
by the injured party against him and the other wrongdoers.24
As indicated above, the release of one joint tort-feasor oper-
ated at common law as a discharge of all the others. 1 Adherence
11. Accord: 4 Restatement, Torts (1939) see. 883.
12. Winn v. Kansas City Belt Ry. (1912) 245 Mo. 406, 151 S. W. 98.
13. Id. at 414, 151 S. W. at 100. See infra, p.
14. McDonald v. Goddard Grocery Co. (1914) 184 Mo. App. 432, 440, 171
S. W. 650. But even though the instrument were a covenant not to sue,
the other defendants would be discharged if the plaintiff received full satis-
faction, notwithstanding an intention not to discharge. Dictum in Arnett
v. Missouri Pacific Ry. (1896) 64 Mo. App. 368, 376.
15. 1 Cooley, Torts (4th ed. 1932) 264, sec. 83; 4 Restatement, Torts
(1939) sec. 885(1).
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to this rule was based on several grounds. As a cause of action
is one and indivisible, it was thought necessarily to be destroyed
by the release.2r The releasor is not entitled to receive more than
full compensation.- If the release were under seal, complete
satisfaction was presumed to have been given.'8
Before the private seal was abolished in Missouri, a release
under seal was regarded as being in complete satisfaction and,
therefore, as discharging the other tort-feasors.19 When the force
of the seal was abolished, - , a release effective to discharge the
other tort-feasors was required to recite a full satisfaction or
declare a release in express terms.21
In order to prevent discharge of all tort-feasors by a release,
injured parties often framed the release so as to reserve the
right to sue certain of the tort-feasors. At early common law
such a reservation was void as repugnant to the fundamental
character of a release.2 2 But the Missouri courts gave force to
the reservation23 on the theory that a release with a reservation
is similar to a covenant not to sue, and that consequently the
release of one tort-feasor would not discharge all. 24
When a reservation of a right to sue the other tort-feasors was
given effect, those against whom the rights were reserved were
liable only to the extent that the consideration for the release
did not satisfy the claim.25 Consequently, if the plaintiff acknowl-
edged full satisfaction of the injuries complained of, any effort
to reserve a cause of action against those jointly liable would not
prevent the operation of the bar as to those not included in the
release.2
6
16. Comment (1928) 38 Yale L. J. 124, and cases there cited.
17. Ibid.
18. McBride v. Scott (1903) 132 Mich. 176, 93 N. W. 243; Comment
(1920) 18 Mich. L. Rev. 680.
19. Arnett v. Missouri Pacific Ry. (1896) 64 Mo. App. 368.
20. Mo. Laws of 1893, 117; R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2957.
21. Dulaney v. Buffum (1903) 173 Mo. 1, 73 S. W. 125; Hubbard v. St.
Louis & Meramec River R. R. (1903) 173 Mo. 249, 72 S. W. 1073, where
plaintiffs gave a receipt "in full settlement and satisfaction of all claims
and demands in our favor"; Chicago Herald Co. v. Bryan (1906) 195 Mo.
574. 92 S. W. 902; Judd v. Walker (1911) 158 Mo. App. 156, 164, 138 S. W.
655.
22. Comment (1931) 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 503.
23. Funk v. Kansas City (Mo. App. 1912) 208 S. W. 840. In Dulaney v.
Buffum (1903) 173 Mo. 1, 15, 73 S. W. 125, the court refused to give effect'
to a reservation of a cause of action as to those not released; but this was
because the plaintiff had acknowledged full satisfaction of all injuries com-
plained of in the petition.
24. Funk v. Kansas City (Me. App. 1912) 208 S. W. 840; Berry v.
Pullman Co. (C. C. A. 5, 1918) 249 Fed. 816.
25. Funk v. Kansas City (Mo. App. 1912) 208 S. IV. 840.
26. Dulaney v. Buffum (1903) 173 Mo. 1, 73 S. W. 125.
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In 1915 the common law of release was modified by the follow-
ing addition to the Missouri contribution statute:
It shall be lawful for .all persons having a claim or cause of
action against two or more joint tort-feasors or wrong-
doers to compound, settle with, and discharge any and every
one or more of said joint tort-feasors or wrongdoers for
such sum as such person or persons may see fit, and to re-
lease him or them from all further liability to such person
or persons for such tort or wrong, without impairing the
right of such person or persons to demand and collect the
balance of said claim or cause of action from the other joint
tort-feasors or wrongdoers against whom such person or
persons has such claim or cause of action, and not so re-
leased.2 7
Under the present statute the release of one joint tort-feasor
does not release the others unless the release is "in full of all
damages.'28 For example, one who had been struck by a falling
awning accepted $500 from the owner of the awning before
bringing suit and gave the owner a receipt "in full of all demands
from injury received by the falling of the awning." Because of
this, a subsequent suit against the city was discharged. 29 But,
where the release was "in full of all claims of every kind and
character against the said defendant," the court refused to re-
lease the other tort-feasor. The court distinguished the awning
case, stating that the release there was in full of all demands
arising from the injury, but that in the latter case it was re-
stricted to "all claims * * * against the said defendant."' 0 In the
former case there was nothing to imply that the settlement was
for anything less than the full amount he had suffered from the
injury.
These two cases lend support to the theory that the courts are
really seeking to carry out the intention of the parties. If the
language and the surrounding circumstances evince an intent to
accept a sum in complete satisfaction of all damage, the agree-
27. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3268. Clark v. Union Electric Light & Power
Co. (1919) 279 Mo. 69, 213 S. W. 851, was decided after the amendment
of the contribution statute but followed the common law since the instru-
ment of release had been executed a year before the amendment. Although
the cause of action in Start v. National Newspaper Ass'n (1920) 222 S. W.
870, arose before the amendment of the statute, the statutory rule was
applied because the actual settlement was made subsequent thereto.
28. Burton v. Joyce (Mo. App. 1930) 22 S. W. (2d) 890.
29. Abbot v. Senath (Mo. 1922) 243 S. W. 641.
30. Knoles v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. (1924) 218 Mo. App. 235,
265 S. W. 1005.
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ment will bar further suit against any of the other tort-feasors.3 1
Strangely, however, where the plaintiff made "full settlement for
an automobile accident" with one tort-feasor, it was unsuccess-
fully argued that the words "we hereby release him from all
further liability in the matter" limited the release solely to the
tort-feasor with whom the settlement had been made 2
Where one defendant is primarily liable, the plaintiff may
settle with the co-defendants who were also negligent, but not
primarily so, without affecting his right to proceed against the
one primarily liable.33
Merely pleading full settlement of the cause of action is not
sufficient. This defense must be proved as must any other issue.
To hold otherwise would be to regard a release of one as a re-
lease of all as a matter of law. 4 The construction and interpre-
tation of a written release "'like that of any other instrument'
is for the court. ' 35
Instead of making a full settlement, the plaintiff may accept
part satisfaction from one or more of the joint tort-feasors. In
such instances, those from whom the part satisfaction has been
received may be released in full and the others held for the bal-
ance." Thus, a settlement of "all matters and things in contro-
versy between the plaintiff and the defendant, Linus Pinzel" and
an agreement that "the cause be dismissed as to the defendant,
Linus Pinzel" was held to be a separate settlement and release
of that defendant-not impairing the plaintiff's right to collect
the balance from the other defendant joint tort-feasors3 7 Even
though there be no release, such payments by one tort-feasor
"are available pro tanto to the use of the other as a matter of
mitigation in the final award of damages accrued because of the
tort of both."3
Not to be overlooked, however, is the basic principle of law
31. Comment (1936) 21 ST. Louis LAw Rviuw 270, and cases there
cited.
32. McEwen v. Kansas City Public Service Co. (1929) 225 Mo. App. 194,
19 S. W. (2d) 557 (Italics supplied).
33. Jamison v. Kansas City (1929) 223 Mo. App. 684, 17 S. W. (2d)
621.
34. Booker v. Kansas City Gas Co. (1936) 231 'Mo. App. 214, 96 S. W.
(2d) 919.
35. State ex rel. Caraker v. Becker (1933) 333 Mo. 400, 62 S. W. (2d)
899.
36. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3268; Clifton v. Caraker (Mo. App. 1932) 50
S. W. (2d) 758; Booker v. Kansas City Gas Co. (1936) 231 Mo. App. 214,
96 S. W. (2d) 919; 4 Restatement, Torts (1939) sec. 885(3).
37. Clifton v. Caraker (Mo. App. 1932) 50 S. W. (2d) 758, 761.
38. Judd v. Walker (1911) 158 Mo. App. 156, 169, 138 S. W. 655.
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that there can be but one satisfaction for one wrong.39 Conse-
quently, where the settlement is in full satisfaction of the plain-
tiff's claim, nothing can be recovered from the tort-feasors not
released.40 So also, an injured person who sues one tort-feasor
and recovers a judgment in complete satisfaction of his injury
cannot subsequently sue another tort-feasor who contributed to
the injury. This is true even though the tort-feasors are guilty
of different acts of negligence. 41
In Farrell v. Kingshighway Bridge Co.,42 defendants A and B
were sued jointly. During the prosecution of the suit, the plain-
tiff agreed with A not to sue out execution against him in con-
sideration of a payment by A of $3,500. This was unknown to
the jury. Thereafter the jury returned a verdict against botl&
defendants in the sum of $2,500. Defendant B moved to quash
the levy, stating that the plaintiff had already received full sat-
isfaction. The St. Louis Court of Appeals upheld the verdict on
the ground that the payment of $3,500 could not constitute a
payment of the judgment because the judgment was not yet in
existence and one defendant cannot object to the release of an-
other-no right of contribution arising before judgment. It did
not regard the agreement as a settlement in satisfaction but
rather as a "gamble on the amount of the plaintiff's verdict."
The Missouri statute changes the common law rule as to dis-
charge and consequently should be strictly construed. It has
already been stated that under the statute a release of one joint
tort-feasor does not impair the plaintiff's right to recover the
balance from the others. By implication, if there is no balance,
there should be no recovery against the others. This is in line
with the generally accepted proposition that there can be but
one satisfaction for one injury. If there had been a release of
A for $500 and judgment had been against both for $2,500, the
plaintiff would have been limited to the recovery of $2,000. In
the Farrell case the plaintiff received $3,500 while the jury as-
sessed his damage by both defendants at $2,500. Surely he was
not entitled to receive the additional $2,500. Satisfaction for an
injury may be shown in two ways: "as a matter of law" or as
39. Arnett v. Missouri Pacific Ry. (1896) 64 Mo. App. 368; Judd v.
Walker (1911) 158 Mo. App. 156, 138 S. W. 655; Booker v. Kansas City
Gas Co. (1936) 231 Mo. App. 214, 96 S. W. (2d) 919.
40. Abbot v. Senath (Mo. 1922) 243 S. W. 641; Burton v. Joyce (Mo.
App. 1930) 22 S. W. (2d) 890.
41. Payne v. Bertnan and Kelly (1930) 224 Mo. App. 690, 27 S. W. (2d)
28.
42. (1938) 117 S. W. (2d) 693.
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a "matter of fact."' True, there was here no intention to dis-
charge the other defendant, but actually and as a "matter of
fact," the plaintiff had received more than what the jury con-
sidered full satisfaction for the injury. A dictum in one of the
earlier cases indicates that this would discharge the other de-
fendant even in the case of a covenant not to sue.4" Since we
have involved here a covenant not to sue out execution and since
the basis of the rule is the idea of one satisfaction for one in-
jury, it would appear that the court should have entered an
order to quash the $2,500 levy-possibly conditioned on the pay-
ment by the defendant B of one-half the money actually paid out
by A. For practical purposes this would have been equivalent to
treating the motion to quash as an equitable prayer for an in-
junction against levying an execution.
ACTIONS BETWEEN JOINT TORT-FEASORS
A. The Rule Denying Contribution
The rule that there can be no contribution between joint tort-
feasors has been repeated often and is well-known. But this
absolute statement contains elements of untruth. In reality, every
case in which it may be correctly applied could probably be
matched with another in which its use would be incorrect.4 5
It is true that the English common law formerly regarded this
as a settled rule. The doctrine had its inception in 1799 in Merry-
weather v. Nixan.46 In that case, Lord Kenyon, Ch. J., relied on
no previous decision denying contribution in tort to justify his
departure from the rule of contribution 47 obtaining in other
fields of the law. On the contrary, the only reason he gave was
that he could recall no instance where such relief had been
granted. It should be noted that this case was one in which the
tort-feasors had acted in concert and were probably conscious
of the fact that they were doing wrong. Nevertheless, the courts,
relying on this case as authority, denied contribution where the
one seeking it was a wrongdoer only to the extent that he was
liable in a tort action. The explanation of this probably lies in
the fact that at the time all tort liability seems to have been
imposed as a penalty for wrongdoing.48
Certain rules of public policy continue to be advanced to justify
43. Arnett v. Missouri Pacific Ry. (1896) 64 Mo. App. 368, 373.
44. Id. at 376.
45. See supra, pages 572, 573.
46. (K. B.) 8 T. R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337; Williams, supra note 5.
47. Woodward, op. cit. supra note 6, at 401, sec. 255.
48. Bohlen, supra note 1, at 557; Pollack, op. cit. supra note 1, at 4.
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the denial of a right of contribution: (1) such denial will serve
to deter the commission of misconduct because the tort-feasor
would know that he would very likely be forced to shoulder the
entire liability himself; (2) no one should be allowed to make
his own misconduct the grounds for an action in his favor; (3)
courts have no interest in, nor have they time for, those who
disregard the law; (4) "'The law has no scales' to measure the
relative fault of two negligent persons. '49
In answer to these arguments, it may be said that they can be
justly applied only where the tort-feasor is conscious of the fact
that he is doing wrong. Those liable in tort without moral fault,
and possibly only secondarily liable by operation of law, can-
not so readily be attacked on the basis of these arguments. Fur-
thermore, some of these arguments are of doubtful validity even
in those cases where there is a conscious commission of a wrong.
There would be little likelihood of a deterrent effect in the com-
mission of torts inasmuch as the rule of no contribution would
probably be unknown to most of those contemplating the com-
mission of a tort. Some might know of it and yet be willing to
take the chance that the other tort-feasor would have to pay.
Furthermore, that the law has scales for the measuring of rela-
tive fault is shown by the application in certain courts of a rule
which makes contributory negligence a consideration in arriving
at the amount of damages to be given.-'
The rule denying contribution is objectionable for various rea-
sons. No longer is tort liability imposed as a penalty for wrong-
doing. Today, it is intended to shift the loss caused by tortious
conduct to those who may properly and justly be required to
bear it. On this basis, the justice of allowing contribution be-
tween joint tort-feasors would seem to follow as a matter of
course. Another objection to the denial of contribution is the
likelihood of undesirable social consequences. A fertile field for
collusion is laid open-one tort-feasor may approach the injured
party with attractive offers and thus induce him to proceed
against one of the other tort-feasors.
It is common knowledge that such undercover dealings occur
constantly in personal injury cases involving joint tort-
feasors, although affirmative record of them seldom appears
in the reported decisions.51
49. Bohlen, supra note 1, at 557; Leflar, supra note 3, at 133.
50. Bohlen, supra note 1, at 557-560.
51. Leflar, supra note 3, at 137, footnote 35.
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B. The Missouri Contribution Statute-
Its Nature and Extent
Because of the hardships and injustices arising from a strict
adherence to the rule of no contribution, many of the states have
modified and relaxed it by statute or decision. In 1855 Missouri
enacted its contribution statute:
Defendants in a judgment founded on an action for re-
dress of a private wrong shall be subject to contribution,
and all other consequences of such judgment, in the same
manner and to the same extent as defendants in a judgment
in an action founded on contract.52
The meaning and effect of this statute depends, of course, upon
its interpretation. Therefore it is essential to focus attention on
the cases which have arisen under the statute.
An understanding of the cases is of necessity dependent upon
the definition of the essential terms. Formerly, the Missouri Su-
preme Court regarded the contribution clause of the statute as
applying only to persons between whom there was an intentional
unity or concert of action; this excluded those between whom
there had been merely an unintentional concurrence of acts which
produced a single injury.53 The court in a subsequent case
changed its opinion and held that the statute
applies to a case of a negligent omission of duty on the part
of several tort-feasors which concurred in causing an injury,
though there was no unity or concert of action on their
part.54
Furthermore, a distinction must be made between "contribu-
tion" and "indemnity." The right to indemnity arises from an
express or implied contract, while contribution does not spring
from a contract but is based on the principle "that equality of
burden as to a common right is equity, and that wherever there
is a common right the burden is also common." 5 Full reimburse-
ment is recovered in an indemnity action, but contribution affords
recovery of only a portion of the judgment56 Thus, if two de-
52. R. S. Mo. (1855) c. 51, sec. 8 (now contained in R. S. Mo. (1929) sec.
2268). For a list of contribution statutes of other states, see Note (1931)
45 Harv. L. Rev. 369.
53. Paddock-Hawley Iron Co. v. Rice (1903) 179 Mo. 480, 495, 78 S. W.
634, 638.
54. Kinloch Telephone Co. v. St. Louis (1916) 268 Mo. 485, 188 S. W.
182.
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fendants are joined in a judgment, the one paying the judgment
may recover from the other one-half of what he paid. If three
or more are involved, each must contribute an equal amount.
As has been previously indicated, 7 contribution originated in
equity which sought to alleviate the hardships of the common
law rule.
The obligation may well be rested on quasi contractual prin-
ciples, for in so far as one tort-feasor pays what in equity
and good conscience another tort-feasor ought to pay, the
latter receives a benefit at the expense of the former, the
retention of which is unjust.5 8
But has the enactment of a statute permitting contribution
changed the remedy from one of an equitable to one of a legal
nature? The prevailing opinion in Missouri is that it has. In
Missouri District Telegraph Co. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co.,59 a judgment for personal injuries had been rendered against
three corporations. One of the corporations paid the judgment
and sued the other two for contribution in an action joining the
causes and the two parties. The court regarded the action as one
clearly at law and held that there was a misjoinder of actions
and parties. Brewster v. Gauss,60 which was brought in equity,
was distinguished by the statement that it "involved not only
numerous parties but also facts which properly invoke principles
of equity jurisprudence. ' 61
The Telegraph Company case, setting forth the prevailing
opinion, was decided by a court of seven judges. Three of them,
basing their opinion on what appear to be valid grounds, did not
agree that an action for contribution was solely legal. They
stated that, since jurisdiction to enforce contribution was origi-
nally equitable, nothing beyond facts showing a right to con-
tribution from more than one person need be stated to bring an
action in equity. They reasoned that
the statute neither makes provision concerning the form of
the action nor provides whether the right granted may be
enforced at law or in equity. It does provide that joint tort-
57. See supra, pages 573, 574.
58. Woodward, op. cit. supra note 6, at 409, sec. 259.
59. (1936) 338 Mo. 692, 93 S. W. (2d) 19. But the court found that,
a jury having been waived, the misjoinder and the hearing of the case as
though in equity "worked no injury" to the defendants, and affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
60. (1866) 37 Mo. 518. Discussed infra, pages 584-586.
61. Missouri District Telegraph Co. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.(1936) 338 Mo. 692, 703, 93 S. W. (2d) 19.
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feasors against whom a judgment has been rendered "shall
be subject to contribution... in the same manner and to
the same extent as defendants in a judgment founded on
contract." This means that to find the remedy available to
enforce contribution among joint tortfeasors, we must find
what remedy there was for contribution between defendants
in a judgment based on contract. * * * The statute is not
susceptible of any other interpretation.62
Contribution was found to have originated in equity. This be-
ing so, the concurring judges felt that there was no reason why
a contribution suit might not still be brought in equity and cited
a statement of Mr. Justice Story that jurisdiction assumed by
law in no way affected that which "originally and intrinsically"
belonged to equity. 3
May contribution be recovered in Missouri except under the
statute? Judge Goode stated that "Independently of a statute,
both indemnity and contribution are allowed among wrongdoers
under proper circumstances."' 64 He indicated that contribution
might be had in the case of a negligent tort, "when there was
no intentional wrong or moral guilt, but two or more tortfeasors
were actually to blame in fact as well as in law * * *."65 In sup-
port of this he cites decisions by the courts of various states but
none from Missouri. He says, in effect, "If we had no statute,
this would be the rule."
But Missouri has a statute; and, as a general rule, it is the
only path which will lead to contribution. This is indicated by
those cases which refuse contribution between joint tort-feasors
simply because no joint judgment was had against them as re-
quired by the statute.6" It has been said that there is an excep-
tion to the rule, where A committed no active wrong but paid
the damages because liable by legal imputation, while B actually
committed the wrong and was really the one at fault.67 Actions
in which the negligence of one defendant is primary and that of
the others secondary or constructive, are cases of indemnity and
not contribution and logically fall outside the statute. Thus, a
city which has paid a judgment for injuries sustained by an
62. Id. at 714, 93 S. W. (2d) at 29.
63. Missouri District Telegraph Co. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
(1936) 338 Mo. 692, 93 S. W. (2d) 19.
64. Eaton & Prince Co. v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. (1906) 123 Mo.
App. 117, 128, 100 S. W. 551.
65. Id. at 131, 100 S. W. at 554.
66. See infra, page 588, and cases there cited.
67. Kilroy v. St. Louis (1912) 242 Mo. 79, 145 S. W. 769; Flenner v.
Southwest Missouri R. R. (1926) 221 Mo. App. 160, 290 S. W. 78.
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individual who fell because of a hole next to a sidewalk can
recover against the person whose active negligence caused the
dangerous condition.88 The city by proving the primary negli-
gence of the defendant is entitled to recover as indemnity the
amount which it had paid. "The principle on which such in-
demnities are allowed is that the ultimate loss ought to fall where
the blame rests" 89 But if
* * * the facts are such that each may be liable to the party
injured by reason of some wrongful act or neglect of his own
which has contributed to the injury and such act has been
committed by him jointly with the other party charged with
the tort, or is disconnected from any act of the other party
but committed in such a way as to make him liable to the
injured party independently of any act committed by the
other party, then the right of contribution does not exist
except by force of the statute.70
The cases in which the tort-feasors are equally guilty may be
divided into two basic groups--one in which the torts were in-
tentional, and a second in which mere negligence was involved.
Can there then be contribution between intentional wrong-
doers? Under the common law all courts refuse contribution
where the joint tort-feasors are intentional wrongdoers.71 The
effect of the contribution statute on this type of case in Missouri
cannot be definitely stated, for the decisions give no certain or
satisfactory answer. All that can be said must be gathered from
scattered statements in the opinions. In Brewster v. Gauss72 the
plaintiff and defendant had successively and independently levied
attachments upon goods not the property of the judgment debtor.
They were erroneously sued as joint trespassers, and judgment
was recovered against them on that basis. Since no objection
was made to that error in the judgment, contribution was al-
lowed the one who paid the judgment. Actually, although they
were regarded as joint trespassers, there is nothing in the case
that shows the "trespass" to have been of an intentional nature.
To the contrary, it would appear that, since the two creditors
levied attachments independently and successively, there was
68. Kinloch Telephone Co. v. St. Louis (1916) 268 Mo. 485, 188 S. W.
182; Springfield v. Clement (1920) 205 Mo. App. 114, 225 S. W. 120, rev'd
on other grounds (1922) 296 Mo. 150, 246 S. W. 175.
69. Eaton & Prince Co. v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. (1906) 123 Mo.
App. 117, 129, 100 S. W. 551.
70. Flenner v. Southwest Missouri R. R. (1926) 221 Mo. App. 160, 164-65,
290 S. W. 78.
71. 1 Cooley, op. cit. supra note 15, at 297, sec. 89.
72. (1866) 37 Mo. 518.
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more probably negligence in ascertaining just where the title
to the goods lay. The St. Louis Court of Appeals in Spalding v.
Citizens' Bank interpreted the opinion of the supreme court in
the Brewster case as saying that the "statute is general in its
nature and applies to all judgments for private wrongs. 7 3 In
reality the court had said only that the statute "applies to all
judgments of this character. '74
In Eaton & Prince Co. v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., the
court, through Judge Goode, intimated that the effect of the
statute on contribution between intentional wrongdoers was ques-
tionable by stating that it covered the case there involved "what-
ever may be said about its effect on the common law rule in
cases of torts either willful or tainted with moral turpitude. '75
But a subsequent statement in the same case seems to proceed
on the theory that contribution would be allowed under the stat-
ute as between intentional wrongdoers.
Shall contribution be allowed among those who conspired
to commit an assault and battery, or a trespass, or to libel,
and not among those who hurt another by failing in some
precaution they should have taken? Surely the Legislature,
in enacting the statute we are dealing with, contemplated
no such interpretation of it.76
Perhaps the most definite statement of all is a dictum in Judd
v. Walker7 to the effect that the statute "confers the right of
contribution between joint tortfeasors after judgment, although
the joint tort involved moral turpitude, indeed fraud and deceit
as here." In support of this statement the court cited the
Brewster case and the Spalding case. But it must be remembered
that the Spalding case stretched the language of the court in
the Brewster case, which was at best an uncertain foundation
upon which to build.
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, there is no Mis-
souri case which squarely holds that contribution is allowed in
cases of intentional wrong or in those involving moral turpitude.
Professor Bohlen suggests that:
73. (1899) 78 Mo. App. 374 (Italics supplied).
74. Italics supplied.
75. (1906) 123 Mo. App. 117, 100 S. W. 551, 555.
76. Id. at 134, 100 S. W. at 556.
77. (1911) 158 Mo. App. 156, 168, 138 S. W. 655. In Avery v. Central
Bank of Kansas City (1909) 221 Mo. 71, 88, 119 S. W. 1106, the court
stated that "the rule of no contribution applies between members of a cor-
poration who have conspired to defraud it." But there had been no joint
judgment against the tort-feasors, and contribution under the statute would
have been impossible regardless of the type of wrong.
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At the most, contribution should be denied only where the
claimant's conduct is not merely in violation of a statute
carrying a criminal penalty, but seriously criminal, and per-
haps where the clainiant's conduct is intentionally wrongful,
in the sense that it is intended to cause the harm which re-
sults from it, and not merely in the sense that a recogniz-
ably risky act has been deliberately done.78
The second group of cases involving tort-feasors who were
equally guilty is that in which the injuries were not intentional
but resulted from negligence.
First may be considered those injuries for which the parties
are jointly liable because of a concert of action. There seems to
be no question that, eliminating the cases involving a guilty in-
tent, contribution is allowed where there has been concert of
action.79 In fact, at one time the Supreme Court of Missouri
stated that, by the weight of authority and the law of the state,
"the right to contribution does not exist unless there has been
concert of action between the tort-feasors.18 0 But this statement
was repudiated by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the Eaton
case which allowed contribution where there was no concert of
action.81 This view was subsequently approved by the higher
court.
2
Secondly, there are those injuries which have as their cause
the concurrence of separate acts of active negligence. As previ-
ously stated, the facts in Brewster v. Gauss83 would seem to point
to negligent action by the tort-feasors. There the plaintiff and
defendant successively and independently levied attachments up-
on goods not the property of their debtor. They were sued as
joint trespassers, and judgment was recovered against both of
them. Brewster paid the judgment and brought an action for
contribution. The acts here were separate, the separate negli-
gences active, and contribution was allowed.
A third type arises out of injuries caused by a concurrence of
78. Bohlen, supra note 1, at 566. A new English statute allows contribu-
tion, not only where the claimant was conscious of wrongdoing, but also
where his misconduct was in violation of a statute carrying criminal penal-
ties. (1935) 25 & 26 Geo. V, c. 30, Part II.
79. Paddock-Hawley Iron Co. v. Rice (1903) 179 Mo. 480, 495, 78 S. W.
634, 638.
80. Ibid. (Italics supplied).
81. Eaton & Prince Co. v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. (1906) 123 Mo.
App. 117, 100 S. W. 551. Discussed infra, p.
82. Kinloch Telephone Co. v. St. Louis (1916) 268 Mo. 485, 188 S. W.
182.
83. (1866) 37 Mo. 518.
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independent negligent omissions of duty., i. e., passive negligence
on the part of all the tort-feasors. This group has apparently
been productive of more decisions and more language in favor of
contribution than any other group.
In Missouri District Telegraph Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co.,84 contribution was again allowed in this type of case.
An employee of the telegraph company was climbing a pole owned
by the telephone company and leased to the telegraph company
when a cross-arm maintained on the pole by a light company
gave way and injured him. He recovered judgment against all
three companies. The telegraph company paid the judgment and
sued the others for contribution. It was found that each com-
pany owed him a duty of ordinary care to inspect and discover
the dangerous condition of the cross-arm. The court held that
the negligent omissions of the three companies were "coincident,
concurrent, and contributing equally and alike to constitute one
composite cause of the injury."5 The court's certainty as to the
correctness of its decision is evident from its statement, "The
conclusion is irresistible that respondent is entitled to contribu-
tion against each appellant."'sG
In the Eaton case s7 a widow sought damages for the death of
her husband, a workman, against the owner of a building and
an independent contractor who was installing an elevator. The
evidence showed that both had been negligent. The contractor
failed to warn the workman that the elevator was being moved;
the building owner negligently allowed the elevator to run de-
spite a promise to the deceased that it would not be moved. The
court held that
the remedy ought to lie if the tortfeasors were guilty of only
involuntary and passive breaches of duty which concurrently
and proximately caused the damage, and that the statute was
enacted, among other purposes, to set at rest the uncertainty
of the law in such cases.88
Both parties need not have failed in the omission of the identical
care, but it is sufficient under the statute if they omitted separate
acts of care at the same time.
The holding in this type of case is summarized in a dictum in
Miller v. United Rys.:
84. (1936) 338 Mo. 692, 93 S. W. (2d) 19.
85. Id. at 709, 93 S. W. (2d) at 26.
86. Ibid.
87. Eaton & Prince Co. v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. (1906) 123 Mo.
App. 117, 100 S. W. 551.
88. Id. at 134, 100 S. W. at 556.
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It has been determined that this statute intends the allow-
ance of contribution among defendants in a judgment for
tort on account of the negligent omission of duty of several
independent tortfeasors whose combined negligence con-
curred and contributed to the same injury * * *.89
The discussion has thus far dealt with the type of wrong in
which contribution will be allowed. Next to be considered is the
effect of the statute on the right of a tort-feasor who has com-
mitted such a wrong. Can he recover contribution if no judg-
ment has been rendered against the other defendant? Can he
bring in a third party who has not been joined by the plaintiff?
How must he plead his case? Can he object to the dismissal of
another defendant? If he appeals, can he rely on errors apply-
ing to the other defendants?
The right of one joint tort-feasor to recover contribution from
another is limited by the Missouri statute to cases in which a
judgment has been rendered against both.90 Such a requirement
need be met in only a few of the jurisdictions permitting tort
contribution.91 By the language of the statute, it is to apply only
to "defendants in a judgment." "The right to contribution does
not arise, even under the statute, until a joint judgment is had,
and until then one wrongdoer may not complain if the injured
party elects to pursue another alone.119 2 Consequently, this
remedy is not available where judgment goes against one de-
fendant and in favor of the other defendant,5 where the plain-
tiff sues only one of several tort-feasors,9 or where he sues all
but dismisses as to all but one.95
Because of the necessity of complying with this requirement,
the statute really places contribution under the control of the
injured plaintiff. He is the only one who can say whether he
wishes to recover judgment against any particular tort-feasor.
In other words, the burden rests where the injured person
89. (1911) 155 Mo. App. 528, 547, 134 S. W. 1045. Cited again in Kin-
loch Telephone Co. v. St. Louis (1916) 268 Mo. 485, 496, 188 S. W. 182.
90. Moudy v. St. Louis Dressed Beef & Prov. Co. (1910) 149 Mo. App.
418, 130 S. W. 476.
91. Md. Ann. Code (Bagby, Supp. 1929) art. 50, sec. 12A; N. M. Stats.
Ann. (1929) sec. 76-101; N. Y. Thompson's Laws (1939) Civil Practice Act.
sec. 211-a; Tex. Vernon's Stats. (1936) art. 2212; W. Va. Code (1932) sec
5482.
92. Judd v. Walker (1911) 158 Mo. App. 156, 138 S. W. 655.
93. Flenner v. Southwest Missouri R. R. (1926) 221 Mo. App. 160, 290'
S. W. 78.
94. Dictum in Cunningham v. Franke (Mo. App. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d)
106.
95. Ibid.
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chooses to place it. It seems anomalous that contribution, a
remedy for the promotion of justice and equity between joint
tort-feasors, should be thus dependent on the personal whim of
the injured party. Under a statute of this type, some method
by which one tort-feasor could bring in another as co-defendant
might prove very desirable96
In an action for contribution under the Missouri statute, a
prior judgment rendered against joint tort-feasors is sufficient
to constitute prima facie evidence in a subsequent action for con-
tribution. Thus a petition, which alleged that the judgment was
obtained against both parties because of their negligent acts and
that the plaintiff seeking contribution paid under compulsion,
stated a cause of action. Proof of this was regarded as sufficient
to state a prima facie case. "Then the burden would fall on re-
spondent to show no contribution ought to be awarded, because
appellant was primarily and actually in fault and respondent
only secondarily so."'
Before the addition of the release clause to the contribution
statute, the right of one joint tort-feasor to object to the dis-
missal of another presented an interesting problem. The view
was expressed that
* * * natural justice alone requires that they should both be
permitted to defend throughout the entire course of the liti-
gation in order to reduce the amount of recovery against
either or both, to the payment of which they may eventually
be called upon to contribute in equal parts. 8
But this statement ignores the fact that the person dismissed
need not fear being approached for contribution-that right ex-
ists only as between joint judgment debtors.
In Berkson v. Kansas City Cable Ry.,9  the contribution clause
of the statute was considered, and the same result was reached as
would be the case under the statute as it stands today. The court
pointed out that as between joint tort-feasors no right of contri-
96. An amendment of R. S. Mo. (1929) section 703, relating to the per-
missive joinder of defendants, so as to authorize the third party practice
described in No. 14 of the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, would be
of great aid in this connection.
97. Eaton & Prince Co. v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. (1906) 123 Mo.
App. 117, 138, 100 S. W. 551. For a typical form of petition in a contribu-
tion action, see 5 Houts, Missouri Practice and Pleading (1936) 434, sec.
2055.
98. Miller v. United Rys. (1911) 155 Mo. App. 528, 547, 134 S. W. 1045,
1051.
99. (1898) 144 Mo. 211, 45 S. W. 1119. Accord: Kilroy v. St. Louis(1912) 242 Mo. 79, 82, 145 S. W. 769.
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bution existed except as between those joined in a judgment.
Consequently, it was held that one tort-feasor could not object
that all the tort-feasors had not been joined and that the plain-
tiff could have dismissed as to one of the defendants without
the consent of the others at any stage of the proceedings with-
out affecting his right of action or the character or the amount
of judgment he receives.
Furthermore, a case decided since the amendment of the statute
states that its contribution clause
* * * creates rights and obligations as between defendants
in a judgment founded upon an action for tort. It imposes
no duty whatever upon the plaintiff with respect thereto. It
neither requires plaintiff to bring his action against all the
joint tort-feasors, nor does it require him to obtain a valid
judgment against all whom he does elect to sue.'
Still important is the question of the right of an appealing
defendant to rely on errors applying to another defendant. In
Flenner v. Southwest Missouri R. R.,2 a railroad passenger, in-
jured by the collision of a train and a bus, sued the two jointly.
Judgment was in favor of the bus owner and against the railroad.
During the trial, the court had committed an error which oper-
ated to benefit the bus owner. On appeal, the railroad sought a
reversal because of that error. As judgment was not had against
both, the court stated that
* * * no right of contribution exists, and, since it does not,
each party must defend just as he would if sued alone and
on appeal can only take advantage of errors that apply to
him alone or to both jointly. This appellant cannot, on this
appeal, take advantage of any error that applies only to de-
fendant Cook.3
By implication it would appear that, had judgment gone against
both, one defendant would have been permitted to allege errors
committed with respect to the other. The St. Louis Court of Ap-
peals apparently relied upon this implication, for they allowed
an appeal by one defendant on the basis of errors committed as
to the other defendants, citing the Flenner case.4 However, the
supreme court regarded the decision as unsound and quashed the
opinion and the judgment with the explanation that
1. State ex rel. Cunningham v. Haid (1931) 328 Mo. 208, 40 S. W. (2d)
1048, 1050; Lavignon v. Dietzel (Mo. 1931) 34 S. W. (2d) 92; Newdiger
v. Kamsas City (1937) 342 Mo. 252, 114 S. W. (2d) 1047.
2. (1926) 221 Mo. App. 160, 290 S. W. 78.
3. Id. at 165, 290 S. W. at 79.
4. Cunningham v. Franke (Mo. App. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d) 106, 107.
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This court has repeatedly held that in such actions one de-
fendant will not be heard to complain of an error committed
against a co-defendant, even though the error necessitates a
reversal of the judgment as to the co-defendant. 5
In Gabelman v. Bolt6 the appellant conceded the fact that ordi-
narily a defendant in a tort case could not complain of error
committed during the trial as to a co-defendant. He did not base
his appeal on the grounds that he had been deprived of a possible
right to contribution from his co-defendant, but argued that the
usual rule did not apply if the error as to the other defendant
adversely affected and prejudiced his interests. The court of
appeals concurred in his argument, found that his defense had
been affected injuriously, and allowed his appeal on the basis
of the errors as to the other defendant. A dissenting judge certi-
fied the case to the supreme court which agreed with the argu-
ment of the appellant but held that he had not been prejudiced.7
The court stated that the argument was good law and based on
right and justice. In support of this statement, it cited Barr v.
Nafziger Baking Co.8 That case affirmed the right of one de-
fendant to appeal on the theory that he was prejudiced by an
erroneous instruction in favor of the other defendant.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this note has been to collect the Missouri
authorities with respect to this subject--only occasionally ques-
tioning the validity of a statement or decision. As is apparent,
no attempt has been made to weigh the effectiveness or to criti-
cize the general application of the Missouri statute dealing with
release and contribution. That aspect of the problem would re-
quire numerous practical considerations necessarily omitted be-
cause of limitations of space.
Retrospection leads to the hope that in the application of our
contribution statute, the following two factors will be kept in
mind. First, tort liability is no longer imposed as a penalty for
wrongdoing; its purpose is to shift the burden of loss caused by
tortious conduct to those who may be properly required to bear
it. Second, and almost equally important, contribution after all
originated in equity; its application should reflect that origin.
JULius K. FRIEDRICH.
5. State ex rel. Cunningham v. Haid (1931) 328 Mo. 208, 212, 40 S. W.
(2d) 1048, 1050.
6. (Mo. App. 1934) 68 S. W. (2d) 909.
7. Gabelman v. Bolt (1935) 336 Mo. 539, 80 S. W. (2d) 171.
8. (1931) 328 Mo. 423, 41 S. W. (2d) 559.
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